Topic Executive Agreement
Figure 4 shows estimated coefficients and confidence intervals of 95 percent for all x over the range [0, 0.1]. Even assuming strictly that the 10% of the shortest executive agreements are exclusive executive agreements, there is still a substantial difference between the treaties and the executive agreements of Congress, statistically different from 0. « Glen Krutz and Jeffrey Peakes Treaty Politiy Politics and the Rise of Executive Agreements provide a provocative analysis of a neglected subject. Their theoretical and empirical challenge to the usual explanation of the growth of executive agreements, their careful analysis of the contract process in the Senate and when this body can be decisive, and their assessment of the role of the House of Representatives in the agreement process offer important new scholarships for students in the presidency, Congress and foreign policy. — James M. McCormick, Iowa State University To Hathaway, the treaty is a less reliable instrument and should be abandoned in favor of the executive agreement of Congress. Their assertion has sparked heated discussion among scholars of international law. For example, the American Journal of International Law`s online companion published in 2014 under the title The End of Treaty?, the online companion of the American Journal of International Law, several essays by eminent scholars and State Department officials who discussed whether the treaty would have a place in the future of U.S. foreign policy. Footnote 44 42 Hathaway, supra note 1, at 1239-40 (« Although there are models for the current practice of using either type of agreement, these models have no identifiable rational basis »). 83 See McLaughlin, C.H., The Scope of the Treaty Power in the States II, 43 Minn. L. Rev.
651, 721 (1958) (calculates that 5.9% of the agreements were concluded between 1883 and 1957 as exclusive executive agreements or « presidential agreements »); see also International Agreements: An Analysis of Executive Regulations and Practices, at 22, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 95th Congress, 1st Sess. (1977) (calculation that 5.5% of the agreements from 1946 to 1972 were exclusively based on executive power). 52 Martin believes that the cost differential for the difference between executive and exclusive contracts is the largest, but it extends its argument to the difference between the executive agreements of Congress and the treaties. See Martin, supra note 15, at 447. 3 Wallace McClure, International Executive Agreements: Democratic Procedure Under the Constitution of the United States 378 (1941) (on the grounds that the treaty should be replaced by the executive agreement, unless « there is no public opinion and there is no question of treaty acceptance »); Edwin Borchard, Book Review: International Executive Agreements: Democratic Procedure Under the Constitution of the United States, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 887 (1942) (refuting McClure`s argument and calling it unconstitutional); See also Borchard, Edwin, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 Yale L.J. 664 (1944) (executive agreements characterized as an instrument of lower engagement). The Habana Package, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also, z.B.
Galo-Garcia v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 86 F.3d 916 (9. Cir. 1996) ( [W] here an executive or legislative act of control . . . . international customary law is not applicable. » (Quote omitted). The prevailing view is that agreement between congressional executives can in any event be used as an alternative to the contractual method. The procedure to be followed is a political judgment that will be rendered in the first place by the President, subject to the possibility that the Senate will refuse to consider a joint resolution of Congress to approve an agreement and insists that the President present the agreement in the form of a treaty. Footnote 37 The results of a proportional regression cox survival time on a contractual indicator and several covariates.